like the ideas and things they are meant to signify, have a history. Neither Oxford dons nor the Academie Franpise have been entirely able to stem the tide, to capture and fix n~eanings free of the play of human invention and imagination. 1Iary Ll'ortley Jlontagu added bite to her witty denunciation "of the fair sex" ("my only consolation for being of that gender has been the assurance of never being nlarried to any one among them") by deliberately misusing the grammatical reference.' Through the ages. people have made figurative allusions by employing gra~n~natical to evoke traits of'character o r sexuality. For example, the usage tei.111~ offered by the Ilic.tiotrticcirr clr In lcrng~rc /~.NIIc(I~.\P in 1876 was, "On ne sait d e quel genre il est, s'il est male ou femelle, se dit d'un h o~n m e tres-cache, dont on ne connait pas les sentiments."' And (;ladstone made this distinction in 1878: "Athene has nothing of sex except the gender, nothing of the woman except the form."" hlost recently-too recently to find its wa! into dictionaries or the Enc~clofiedicr of llle Sot.ic~1 St.irr1c.r.c-feminists have in a more literal and serious vein begun to use "gender" as a way of referring t o the social organization of the relationship between the sexes. T h e connection to grammar is both explicit and full of unexamined possibilities. Explicit because the grammatical usage involves formal a b o u~ a r~d .I-hi\ article is for Eliz,~l)e~ti \Vee(l. \\ l~o t'iugl~t lllr hou to t l i i r~l g r~~t i e r thro~-y. It was hrst 1)1-epar-eti for t i e l i \ e~\ .II the lrleetir~g of the :11ne1-ican IIi,tc)~-ical .Aasoeiatior~ i r~Nr\c Y o r l City. . I an1 tlerpl\ i;ratc.ful IO Denise Rile!, who sho~veti m e how a liis~orian rnight ~v o r k \\.itti and ~h r o i l i ; t~ Doane.Ja,rnine Ergs\, .Anne S o r t o n , and IIarrirt tVhitrheati. theol-\ : ;il\o ~o , ] a r~i c e all nlrn11)el-s of the \ r~~~i r l , i r " ( : u l t~~r a l at Brown Yniversitv's o n (:ons~ructionsof (;entiern held I'en~hl-oke ( : e n t e~ f o~ . I -e a c t~i~~g TVomrn tir~l-ing 1982-85 . S~~g g r s t i o n s ;inti Kesral-c h O I I a n d criticisnls tr-om mcnlhers of the Flis~o~-ic;il Stutlies tVork\tiop at the Ne\\ Sctiool tor Social Krsearch, rspecially Ira I ,~I L I I~~\~) I I .
s. (:bar-les 7'ill). ,inti Louise .A. 1ill\. torced me to cl,irif\ h e al-gumcnt in important ~v a~ (.olnlnents t r o n~ other t~-i r~~d s anti colleaglirs have al\o been extremrl\ helpful, especiallk thosr of t l i \ ; i l > r~~a D~r i a l d lvas at (;;tlrotti, Ka\ na Kapp, (:hri\tine Stansrll, ;111ci Jo;i~i I~i~i c r~i t .
Scott, as a l~v a~s , ollce IIIV most tiernantiing allti \upporti\e critic.
rules that follow from the masculine or feminine designation; full of unexarnined possibilities because in many Indo-European languages there is a third categoryurlsexed o r neuter.
In its most recent usage, "gender" seems to have first appeared among American feminists ~v h o wanted to insist on the fundamentally social quality of distinctions based on sex. T h e word denoted a rejection of the biological determinism implicit in the use of such terms as "sex" or "sexual difference." "Gender" also stressed the relational aspect of normative definitions of femininity. Those who worried that women's studies scholarship focused too narrowly and separately on women used the term "gender" to introduce a relational notion into our analytic vocabulary. According to this view, women and men were defined in terms of one another, and no understanding of either could be achieved by entirely separate study. Thus Natalie Davis suggested in 197.5, "It seems to me that we should be interested in the history of both women and men, that we should not be working only o n the subjected sex any more than an historian of class can focus entirely on peasants. O u r goal is to understand the significance of the sexes, of gender groups in the historical past. O u r goal is to discover the range in sex roles and in sexual symbolism in different societies and periods, to find out what meaning they had and how they functioned to maintain the social order or to promote its ~h a n g e . "~ In addition, and perhaps most important, "gender" was a term offered by those who claimed that women's scholarship ~vould fundamentally transform disciplinary paradigms. Feminist scholars pointed out early on that the study of women would not only add new subject matter but ~vould also force a critical reexamination of the premises and standards of existing scholarly work. "Ll'e are learning," wrote three feminist historians, "that the writing of women into history necessarily involves redefining and enlarging traditional notions of historical significance, to encompass personal, subjective experience as well as public and political activities. It is not too much to suggest that howe\,er hesitant the actual beginnings, such a methodology implies not only a new history of women, but also a new history."" T h e way in which this new history lvould both include and account for women's experience rested on the extent to which gender could be developed as a category of analysis. Here the analogies to class (and race) were explicit: indeed, the most politically inclusive of scholars of women's studies regularly invoked all three categories as crucial to the writing of a new history.1' An interest in class, race, and gender signaled first, a scholar's commitment to a history that included stories of the oppressed and an analysis of the meaning and nature of their oppression and, second, scholarly understanding that inequalities of power are organized along at least three axes.
"atalie Zernon Dalis, "tVome~l's IIistol.~ in TI-arlsition: T h e European (:ase," F~ln7tllst Studzer, 3 (1Vi11ter1975-76) : 00.
. I n n D. Gordorl, 5lari,Jo Bullle, and Nancy Shrorn Dye, "The Problern of tVornen 's Hisrory." in Berenice C:arroll, eti.. 1.7h(~~ot1rtg LZ'omptr's H~\ t o q (Yrbana, Ill., 1976) , 89.
" T h e best allti rnosr subtle example is from,Joan Kelly. "The Doubleti Vision o f F e m i~~i s t Theory," ill her LZ'om~tz, Hlctoq 01ld 7'l~eoq(C:hicago, 1084), 51-64, especially 61.
T'he litany of class, race, and gender suggests a parity for each term, hut, in fact, that is not at all the case. LVhile "class" most often rests on hlarx's elaborate (and since elaborated) theory of economic determination and historical change, "race" and "gendei-" carry no such associations. N o unanimit!. exists among those who ernploy concepts of class. Some scholars employ LVeberian notions, others use class as a temporary heuristic device. Still, when we invoke class, we are working with or against a set of definitions that, in the case of hlarxism, involve a n idea of economic causality and a \,ision of the path along which history has moved dialectically. T h e r e is no such clarity o r coherence for either race o r gender. In the case of gender, the usage has involved a range of theoretical positions as well as simple descriptive references to the relationships between the sexes.
Feminist historians, trained as most historians are to be more comfortable with description than theory, have nonetheless increasingly looked for usable theoretical hrrni~lations. They have done so for at least two reasons. First, the proliferation of case studies in women's history seems to call for some synthesizing perspective that can explain continuities and discontinuities and account for persisting inequalities as well as radically different social experiences. Second, the discrepancy between the high quality of recent work in women's history and its continuing marginal status in the field as a whole (as measured by textbooks, syllabi, and monographic rvorh) points u p the limits of descriptive approaches that d o not address dominant clisciplinar!-concepts, o r at least that d o not address these corlcepts in terms that can shake their power and perhaps transform them. It has not been enough for historians of women to prove either that women had a history or that women participated in the major politic.al upheavals of Ll'estern civilization. In the case of women's histor!., the response of niost non-feminist historians has been acknowledgment and then separation or dismissal ("women had a history separate from nlerl's, therefore let feminists d o \\-omen's history, which need not concern us''; o r "women's history is aljor~t sex and the family and should be done separatel!. from political and economic history"). In the case of women's participation, the response has been minimal interest at best ("my understanding of the French Ke\olution is not changed by knotving that women participated in it"). T h e challenge posed b!-these responses is, in the end, a theoretical one. It requires anal!-sis not only o f t h e relationship between male and female experience in the past but also o f t h e connection betlveen past history and current historical practice. How does gender \vork in human social relationships? How does gender give meaning to the organization and perception of historical kno\vledge? T h e answers depend on gender as a n anal!-tic category.
For the no st part, tlie attempts of historians to theorize about gender have remained within traditional social scientific frame~vorks, using longstanding forniulatiolis that provide universal causal explanations. 'l'hese theories have been limited at best because they tend to contain reductive o r overly simple generalizations that undercut not onl!. his tor!.'^ disciplinar!-sense of the complexit!-of social causation but also feminist commitments to anal!-ses that will lead to change.
A review of these theories will expose their limits and make it possible to propose an alternative approach.' THE APPROACHES USED BY MOST HISTORIANS fall into tlvo distinct categories. T h e first is essentially descriptive; that is, it refers to the existence of phenomena or realities without interpreting, explaining, or attributing causality. T h e second usage is causal; it theorizes about the nature of phenomena or realities, seeking an understanding of how and why these take the form they do.
In its simplest recent usage, "gender" is a synonym for "women." Any number of books and articles whose subject is \\-omen's history have, in the past few years, substituted "gender" for "women" in their titles. In some cases, this usage, though vaguely referring to certain analytic concepts, is actually about the political acceptability of the field. In these instances, the use of "gender" is meant to denote the scholarly seriousness of a ~v o r k , for "gender" has a more neutral and objective sound than does "women." "Gender" seems to fit within the scientific terminology of social science and thus dissociates itself from the (supposedly strident) politics of feminism. In this usage, "gender" does not carry with it a necessary statement about inequality or power nor does it name the aggrieved (and hitherto invisible) party. Whereas the term "women's history" proclainls its politics by asserting (contrary to customary practice) that \\-omen are valid historical subjects, "gender" includes but does not name lvomen and so seems to pose n o critical threat. This use of "gender" is one facet of what might be called the quest of feminist scholarship for academic legitimacy in the 1980s.
But onl!-one facet. "Gender" as a substitute for "women" is also used to suggest that information about women is necessarily information about men, that one implies the stud!. of the other. This usage insists that the world of women is part of the world of men, created in and by it. This usage rejects the interpretive utility of the idea of separate spheres, maintaining that to stud!-women in isolation perpetuates the fiction that one sphere, the experience of one sex, has little or nothing to do lvith the other. In addition, gender is also used to designate social relations between the sexes. Its use explicitl!. rejects biological explanations, such as those that find a common denominator for diverse forms of female subordination in the facts that women have the capacit!. to give birth and men have greater muscular strength. Instead, gender becomes a wa!-of denoting "cultural constructions"-the entirel!. social creation of ideas about appropriate roles for women and men. It is a way of referring to the exclusively social origins of the subjective identities of' men and women. Gender is, in this definition, a social category imposed on a sexed body.x Gender seems to have become a particularly useful word as studies of sex and sexuality have proliferated, for it offers a way of differentiating sexual practice from the social roles assigned to women and men. T h e use of gender emphasizes a n entire system of relationships that may include sex, hut is not directly determined by sex o r directly determining of sexuality. These descriptive usages of gender have been employed by historians most often to map out a new terrain. As social historians turned to new objects of stud!., gender was relevant for such topics as women, children, families, and gender ideologies. This usage of gender, in other lvords, refers only to those areas-both structural and ideological-involving relations bet~veen the sexes. Because, on the face of it, war, diplomacy, and high politics have not been explicitly about those relationships. gender seems not to appl!. and so continues to be irrelevant to the thinking of historians concerned ~vith issues of politics and poIver. T h e effect is to endorse a certain functionalist view ultimately rooted in biology and to perpetuate the idea of separate spheres (sex or politics, family or nation, women or men) in the writing of history. Although gender in this usage asserts that relationships betlveen the sexes are social, it sa!-s nothing ahout wh!. these relationships are constructed. as the!-are, how the!-work, or how the!. change. In its descriptive usage, then, gender is a concept associated with the stud!-of things related to women. Gender is a new topic, a new department of historical investigation, but it does not have the anal!-tic power to address (and change) existing historical paradigms.
Some historians Ivere, of course, aIvare of this problem, hence the efforts to emplo!-theories that might explain the concept of gender and account for historical change. Indeed, the challenge was to reconcile theory, which was framed in general or universal terms, and histor!., which was conlnlitted to the stud!. of contextual specificit!. and fundamental change. T h e result has been extremel!. eclectic: partial borrowings that vitiate the anal!-tic power of a particular theor!-or, worse, employ its precepts without awareness of their implications; o r accounts of change that, because they embed universal theories, only illustrate unchanging themes; o r wondtrfully imaginative studies in which theory is nonetheless so hidden that these studies cannot serve as models for other investigations. Because the theories on which historians have drawn are often not spelled out in all their implications, it seems n.orth~vhile to spend some time doing that. Only through such an exercise can rve evaluate the usefulness of' these theories and, perhaps, articulate a more polverful theoretical approach.
Feminist historians have employed a variety of approaches to the analysis of gender, but they come dolvn to a choice between three theoretical positions.The first, an entirely feminist effort, attempts to explain the origins of patriarchy. T h e second locates itself' within a hlarxian tradition and seeks there an accommodation tvith feminist critiques. T h e third, fundamentally divided bet~veen French post-structuralist and Anglo-American object-relations theorists, dra~vs on these different schools of psychoanalysis to explain the production and reproduction of the subject's gendered identity.
Theorists of patriarchy have directed their attention ro the subordination of \vomen and found their explanation for it in the male "need" to dominate the female. In hlary O'Hrien's ingenious adaptation of Hegel, she defined male domination as the effect of men's desire t o transcend their alienation from the means of the reproduction o f t h e species. T h e principle of generational continuity restores the primacy of paternity and obscures the real labor and the social realit!-of' \\-omen's \\-ork in childbirth. T h e source of rvornen's liberation lies in "an adequate understanding of the process of reproduction," a n appreciation of the contradiction betrveen the nature of \\-omen's reproductive labor and (male) ideological mystifications of it."' For Shularnith Firestone, reproduction \\-as also the "bitter trap" for lvornen. In her more materialist analysis, horz.evei-, libel-atiori ~vould come \\-ith transformations in reproductir.e technology, ~vhich might in some not too distant future eliminate the need for wonlen's bodies as the agents of species reproduction.]
If reproduction rvas the key t o patriarchy f i r some, sexuality itself tvas the anslver for others. Catherine hlacKinnon's 1)old formulations \\-ere at once h e r or\-n and characteristic of a certain approach: "Sexuality is to feminism lvhat rvork is to ~narxisnl: that \\-hich is most one's orvn, yet 11lost taken a\\-ay." "Sexual objectification is the primary process of the subjection of rvornen. It unites act rvith word, construction lvith expression, perception \\-ith enforcement, myth rvith reality. hlan fucks woman; sub,ject verb ot~ject."~' Continuing her analogy to Slarx, SlacKinnon offered, in the place of dialectical rnateri:~lisrn, consciousness-raising as feminism's method of analysis. B!. expressing the shared experience of objectif.iccation, she argued, \vomen come to understand their cornrnon identity and so are moved to political action. For hlacKinnon, sexuality thus stood outside ideology, disco\,erable as an unmediated, experienced fact. ,4lthough sexual relations are defined i l l hlacKinnon's analysis as social, there is nothing except the inherent inequality of the sexual relation itself to explain r\.hy the system of' pol\-eloperates as it does. T h e source of unequal relations betu.een the sexes is, in the end, unequal relations betlveen the sexes. Although the inequality of rvhich sexuality is the source is said to be embodied in a "~vhole system of social relationships," how this system ~vorks is not exp1ained.l:'
Theorists of' patriarchy have addl-essed the inequality of' males and females in important \\-ays, but, for historians, their theories pose ~)roblerns. First, lvhile they offer an analysis internal to the gender system itself, they also assert the primacy of'that system in all social organization. But theories ofpatriarcli!-do not show how gender inequality structures all other inequalities or, indeed, hoic gender affects
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of Ri,produrtno~z(London. 1981 in changing aspect. e\.en if' theorists of' ~):itri:irch\ take into accoutit tlie existence of' changirig f0rrns anel s!,stenis of' gericler inequalit\ .I4 X theol-!. that re\ts on the single vari;ible of' p11\ sic:~l diffet-ence poses 11ro1)lerns tor historians: it assumes ;I consistent o r inlierent 1r1e;iliirig for the h u~n a n bod\-outside social or c~i l t~~r : t l constructioti-arlcl thus the ahistoi-icity of' gentler itself'. I-listor! I)econies, in a sense, epiphenomen;~l. 111-ovitling endless \miations on the unclianging theme of :i fixed gericler inecl~~;ilit\.. h~, '11 .x~s t feminists 1ia\ e :I lnore historic;tl a p l )~-o ;~l l , ' . guided ;IS the!. are b! ;i theol.!-of' history. But, ~vh:ite\.e~-the \ari;~tions 2nd :tdal~t:itions h a \ e heen, thc sclfiniposecl r e q u i r e~i i r~i t e n l~l a~i ;~t i o n that there be ;I "~n:~terial" for gentler has lirnitetl ol-at least slotved the de\,elol~ment of' new lines of :~n;tl\-sis. IVliethel-a so-callecl d~~;tl-syster-ns solutio~i is proffered (one that posits the sel);ii-atc I ) r~t ilitel.;~cting realms of'capitalisni ~trid p;itri:irch!,) o r an iirial\sis 1);tsecl 1110re tirnll!. i l l or~tliotlox XIarxist discussioris of niodes of protluction is tle\.elopecl. the explanatiori fill. the origins of' ant1 changes in gender systenis is fc)~irid outside the sexual division of 1;il)or. F;imilies, ho~~seholcls, ant1 sexu;ilit! Lire ;ill, ti~i;llly, proclucts ot ch:ingi~rg mocles of 111-oductiori. 'l'hat is ho\v Engels co~lcluded his exl~loriitions of' the O~.i,qrt:.r,rc o f t l l p I;(i~tlilj; 15 t11;tt is \\.here economist I-leitli I-1;trtrnann's a~i:il\ rests. sis ~i l t i m~~t e l ) I-lartrnann insistecl on the irnl~ort:~nce of' taking illto account ~~ar~-i;trcli\ ant1 capit:ilisni as sep;ir;tte I~u t interacting systcnis. Yet, as hel-argument ~~~i f ' o l ( l s . econoniic c:tus:ilit\ takes precedence, :uitl ~~atri;irch\. aliva! s cle\,elops allel changes as k t t'unctiori of' relations of' production. \\.hen she suggested that "it is necessary to eraclicate the sexu;~l di\ ision of'l~ibor itself to end ~riale tlolriinittion," she liieant encling ~~o b sex.'" segregation t ) ! , Early cliscussions anlorig \l;ti.xist f~riinists circled around the saliie set of ~xoblenis: ;i rejection of' the essenti;tlis~n of' those \\ lio \\.oultl 'irgue that the "exigencies of' 1)iologic;il rel~roduction" (leternline the sexu:il cli\isiori of' 1;tl)or unclei. c:ipititlisr-ri; the futilit! of' inserting "lrlodes of'i. "-1-Ile P -c~~~l i l \tllr LOCLI, ( . l~s . l'ol~tic;~l Struggle: T l~c k:x;in~plt.of I-louse\\ol.k." Si,q11\. ti (Spt.i~rg 1!l81 I : :ititi-$1-1 for a materialist explanation that excludes natural physical d i f ' f e r e n c e~.~~ An important attempt to break our of this circle of problems came from Joan Kelly in her essa),. "The Doubled \'ision of Feminist Theory," 1vhe1-e she arguecl that econo~nic and gender systems interacted to produce social and historical experiences: that neither s\steni rvas causal, but both "operate si~nultaneously to reproduce the socioeconomic ancl male-dominant stiactures of [a] particular social ordei.." Kel1:-'s suggestion that gender systems had an independent existence ~x o \ , i d e d a crucial concel~tual opening, I~u t her commitment to remain lvithin a Slarxist f'i.aine\voi.k led her to e m p h a s i~e the causal role of economic factors even in the determination of the gender system: "The relation of the sexes operates in accor-dance with, and. through, socioecononiic structures, as well as sexlgender ones."lx Kelly introduced the idea of a "sexually based. social reality," hut she tendecl to emphasize the social rather than the sexual nature of that reality, and, niost often, "social," in her usage, was conceived in ternis of econorilic relations of production.
T h e most far-I-eacliing exploratiorl of' sexuality hy Xnierican Marxist feminists is in P07~1(~):5 ~IP.\IT-P,volunie of essays published in 1983.l5' Influenced 11) o/ ;I increasing attention to sex~iality aInong political activists and. scholars, by French philosopher Slichel Foucault's insistence that sexualit) is produced in historical contexts, and hy the co~iviction that the current "sexual revolution" required serious anal)sis, the authors niade "sexual politics" the focus of their inquiry. In so doing, the) opened the question of causality and. offered. a variety of solutions to it; indeed, the real exciteinent of' this volume is its lack of analytic unanimit), its sense of ana1)tic tension. If individual authors tend. to stress the causality of social (by which is often rneant "economic") contexts, they nonetheless include suggestions allout the importance of studying "the psychic structuring of gender identit) ." If "gender ideolog!," is sonietirnes said. to "reflect" economic and social structures, there is also a crucial recognition of the need to understand the complex "link betu.een society and enduring psychic structure."fl) On the one hand, the editors endorseJessica Be~ijamin's point that politics must include attention to "the erotic, fantastic components of hui-rlan life." but, on the other, n o essays besides Benjamin's deal fully o r seriously with the theoretical issues she raises." Instead, a taclt assumption runs through the \olume th'lt 5lnrxlsni can he expanded to Include d~rcusslons of ldeolog\ , culture, and ps\cholog\ and that thir expdnsion ~vill happen through the kind of'concrete examination of evidence undertaken in most of' the articles. T h e advantage of' such an approach lies in its avoidance of sharp differences of position, the disadvantage in its leaving in place a n already fully articulated theory that leads back frorn relations of the sexes based to relations of production.
. A comparison of' -American hlarxist-feminist efforts, explorator> and relatively vide-ranging, to those of' their English counterparts, tied rnore closely to the politics of a strong and viable hlarxist tradition, reveals that the English have had greater difficult> in challenging the constraints of strictly determinist explanations.
This dif'ficulty can 11e seen most dranlatically in the recent debates in the L\rj.rc Lcft R P~~~P Z~I charged her with abandoning bet~veen hlichkle Barrett and. her critics, ~v h o a materialist anal>sis of the sexual division of lal~or under-capitalisn1.2' It can be seen as well in the replacement of an initial ferni~iist attempt to reconcile ps\-choanal>sis and. 5Iarxisnl ~vith a choice of one or another of these theoretical positions b>scholars ~v h o earlier insisted that some fusion of'the two \\.as possible."" T h e difficulty for both English and .American feminists working ~vithirl hlarxism is apparent in the \corks I have mentioned here. ?'he problem they face is the opposite of the one posed. by patriarchal theory. 1Vithin hlarxisn~, the concept of gender has long been treated as the by-product of changing economic structures; gender has had. no indepenclent analytic status of' its own.
A REVIEW OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY REQUIRES;I specification of'schools, since the various approaches have tended. to 11e classified b> the national origins of the founders and the majority of' the practitioners. 'There is the .Anglo-.American school. working within the terms of theories of ol?ject-relations. In the U.S., Nancy Chodorolv is the name rnost readily associated. with this approach. In addition, the work of Carol Gilligan has had a far-reaching impact on American scholarship, including history. C;illigan's work draws on Chodorow's, although it is concerned less \vith the construction of the subject than ~vith nioral development and beha\ ior. In contrast to the Alnglo-.4n~erican school, the French school is )lased oti structuralist and post-structuralist readings of Freud in terms of theories of language (for feminists, the key figure is ,\accjues Lacan).
Both schools are concerned u.ith the processes hy ~vhich the subject's identity is created; both fi~cus on the early stages of child development for clues to the formation of gender identity. Object-relations theorists stress the influence of actual experience (the child sees, hears. relates to those w h o care for it, particu1a1-I?, of'course, to its parents), ~vhile the post-structuralists ernphasiye the centrality of language in communicating, interpreting, and representing gender. (By "laiiguage," post-structuralists d o not iiiean words but s?stenis of meaning-symbolic or-ders-that precede the actual mastery of speech, reading, and ~vriting.) Another difference betueetl the two schools of thought focuses on the unconscious, ~vllich for Chodoron is ultimately subject to conscious understanding and for Lacan is not. For I,:icaniat~s, the unconscious is a critical f;.ictor in the construction of' the su1,ject; it is the location, moreover, of sex~lal clivision and, for that reason, of' continuing instahilit? for the gendei-ecl sul3ject.
In recent !,ears, feminist historians h a \ e been drawn to these theories either because the!, s e n e to enclorse specific findings \\.it11 general ol~ser\ations o r b e c a~~s e they seem to offer an iniportaiit theoretical fortnulation about gender. Iilcreasirigl!, those historians working with a concept of' "Fvonien's cult~lre" cite C:hocloro\t,'s o r Gilligan's work as both proof of atlcl explanation for their interpi-etatioils; those WI-estling with feiriinist theory look to Lacan. In the end, tleither of these theories seenis to me eiitil-ely \vorkahle for historians; a closer look at each iiiay help explain \vh?.
;CI? I-eser~ation about oljject-relations theory concerns its literalistn, its reliance o n relatively small structures of' intet-action to produce gender identity and to generate chiinge. Botli the fiitilil\ di\.ision of labor and the actual assignment of' tasks to each pat-elit pla? a ct.u~ia1 role in Chodorow's theoi-y. T h e outcome of prevailing IVestern systetns is a clear di\ ision I)et\veen male and female: "The hasic ferninine sense of self is connected to the \vorl(l. the hasic masculine sense of self is separate."" A4ccording to Chotlorow, if'fiithers were more in\ ol\ ed in parenting ancl present ri1o1-e often iri clomestic sit~lations. the outcome of the oedipal (11-ama might he ciiffe1~etit.2~ oe(lipus cotnplex, I I I I~the) .ire not its on11 tocur o r outcome. r h e n e~o t l a t i o n ol these issues occurs ill the context of h~-o,~t!er object-relational ant! ego [~r o c r \ \ e \ .
These broatlet. processes h a l e equal iriflurnce on ps\chic structure torlnatiol~. anti p s~c h i c life anti re1,itional motles in met1 a l~d tvonien. T h e \ iiccount fill-tlitteril~g niotlesot itlentihcation ant1 oriel~tation t o heterose\ual objects, for the more a s \~n n l c t r~c .~l oedipal is\ue, ps\(hoanal\rr\ cle\c.r~br, Thesc oirtcotnes, like mor-e tl.aclition,il oedipal outcorncs, arite from the as\ml~ietrical organiratiol~ of p ,~r e n t i l~g , with the ~iiorllrr's role as prirnar? Il;ir-erlt .inti the tatlirr's t\ picall\ greater I rnlotenes\ a l~t l h~s in\estment in socialization especiall~ ill ,ires\ concer-red with gender-t\ ping." (.hocioro\\. Roptotilrrtio?~ o~f.\lot/~c'i?ng.
to note 1 (iti. It is ilnl~ortant t11,tt thet-e a r e tlitferel~ces in il~terpretatioll and appr-oath I~et\veen (:l~otiolow ,111d l3ritish objectThis interpretation limits the concept of gender to family and household experience and, for the historian, leaves n o way to connect the concept (or the individual) to other social systems of economy, politics, o r power. Of' course, it is implicit that social arrangements requiring f'athers to work and mothers to perform most child-rearing tasks structure family organization. Where such arrangements come from and why they are articulated in terms of'a sexual division of labor is not clear. Neither is the issue of inequality, as opposed to that of asymmetry, addressed. Hot\. can we account within this theory for persistent associations of' masculinity with power, for the higher value placed on manhood than on womanhood, for the way children seem to learn these associations and evaluations even when they live outside nuclear households o r in households where parenting is equally divided between husband and wife? I d o not think we can without some attention to symbolic systems, that is, to the ways societies represent gender, use it to articulate the rules of social relationships, o r construct the meaning of' experience. Without meaning, there is n o experience; without processes of signification, there is no meaning (which is not to say that language is everything, but a theory that does not take it into account misses the powerful roles that symbols, metaphors, and concepts play in the definition of human personality and human history.)
Language is the center of Lacanian theory: it is the key to the child's induction into the symbolic order. Through language, gendered identity is constructed. According to Lacan, the phallus is the central signifier of sexual difference. But the meaning of the phallus must be read metaphorically. For the child, the oedipal drama sets forth the terms of' cultural interaction, since the threat of castration embodies the power, the rules of (the father's) law. T h e child's relationship to the law depends on sexual difference, on its imaginative (or fantastic) identification with masculinity o r femininity. T h e imposition, in other words, of' the rules of social interaction are inherently and specifically gendered, fbr the female necessarily has a different relationship to the phallus than the male does. But, gender identification, although it always appears coherent and fixed, is, in fact, highly unstable. Like words themselves, subjective identities are processes of differentiation and distinction, requiring the suppression of' ambiguities and opposite elements in order to assure (and create the illusion of) coherence and common understanding. T h e idea of' masculinity rests on the necessary repression of feminine aspects-of' the subject's potential for bisexuality-and introduces conflict into the opposition of masculine and feminine. Kepressed desires are present in the unconscious and are constantly a threat to the stability of gender identification, denying its unity, subverting its need for security. In addition, conscious ideas of masculine o r feminine are not fixed, since they vary according relations theorists who follolv the work of D. \V. \Vinicott and hfelanie Klein. Chodoro\c's approach is best characterized as a more sociological or sociologized theory, but it is the dominant lens through which object-relations theor) has been liewed b) American feminists. On the histor) of British object-relations theory in relation to social policy, see Denise Riley, U'nr zn the S z~r s r (London, 1984) . to contextual usage. Conflict always exists, then, between the subject's need for the appearance of'wholeness and the imprecision of terminology, its relative meaning, its dependence on repression."' This kind of interpretation makes the categories of "man" and "woman" problerrlatic by suggesting that masculine and feminine are not inherent characteristics but subjective (or fictional) constructs. I'his interpretation also implies that the subject is in a constant process of construction, and it offers a systematic way of interpreting conscious and unconscious desire by pointing to language as the appropriate place for analysis. As such, I find it instructive.
I am troubled, nonetheless, by the exclusive fixation on questions of "the su1?ject1' and by the tendency to reif) subjecti\,ely originating antagonism between males and females as the central fact of' gender. In addition, although there is openness in the concept of how "the subject" is constructed, the theory tends to universalize the categories and relationship of male and female. T h e outcome for historians is a reductive reatlirlg of ejidence from the past. Even though this theory takes social relationships into account by linking castration to prohibition and law, it does not perrnit the introduction of a notion of' historical specificity and variability. T h e phallus is the only signifier; the process of' constructing the gendered subject is, in the end, predictable because a1wa)s the same. If', as film theorist I'eresa d e Lauretis suggests, we need to think in t e r~n s of the construction o f subjectivity in social and historical contexts, there is no way t o specify those contexts within the terms off;ered by Lacan. Indeed, even in d e Lauretis's attempt, social reality (that is, "material, economic and interpersonal [relations] which are in fact social, and in a larger perspective historical") seems to lie outside, apart from the subject." h way to conceive of "soci;ll reality" in terms of' gender is lacking.
T h e problem of sexual antagonism in this theory has two aspects. First, it pr-qjects a certain tirrleless quality, even when it is historicized as well as it has heen by Sally Alexander. Xlexandei-'s reading of Lacan led her to conclude that "antagonism between the sexes is a n unavoidable aspect of the acquisition of'sexual identity . . . If antagonism is always latent, it is possible that history offers no final resolution, only the constant reshaping, reorganizing of the syn~bolization of difference, and the sexual dijision of labor. constructed nature of the opposition [between male and female] produces as one of its effects just that air of an invariant and monotonous nlenlrz.omen opposition,"""
It is precisely that opposition, in all its tedium and monotony, that (to return to the Anglo-American side) Carol Gilligan's work has promoted. Gilligan explained the divergent paths of moral development follotved by boys and girls in terrris of differences of "experience" (li\,ed reality). It is not surprising that historians of women have picked u p her ideas and used them to explain the "different \.oicesw their work has enahled them to hear. 'I'11e problems with these borrowings are manifold, and they are logically connected.:j(l T h e first is a slippage that often happens in the attribution ofcausality: the argument moves from a statement such as "women's experience leads them to make moral choices contingent on contexts and relationships" to "women think and choose this way because they are ~vorrien." Implied in this line of reasoning is the ahistorical, if not essentialist, notion of woman. Gilligan and others have extrapolated her description, based on a small sample of late twentieth-century American schoolchildren. into a statement about all women. This extrapolation is evident especially. but not exclusively, in the discussions by some historians of "women's culture" that take e\,idence from early saints to modern rrlilitant lahoi-actijists and reduce it to proof of Gilligan's hypothesis about a universal female pi-eference for relatednes~.:~' This use of Gilligan's ideas provides sharp contrast to the more complicated and historicired conceptions of "women's culture" evident in the F~ncini.ct Stzrtlirs 1980s! mposium. Indeed, a comparison ofthat set of articles with Gilligan's formulations reveals the extent to which her notion is ahistorical, defining wonianlman as a universal, self-reproducing binary opposition-fixed always in the same way. By insisting on fixed differences (in Gilligan's case. tx simplifying data with more mixed results about sex and moral reasoning to u~iderscore sexual difference), feminists contribute to the kind of thinking they \\,ant to oppose. Although they insist on the revaluation o f t h e category "female" (Gilligan suggests that women's moral choices may be more humane than men's), they d o not examine the binary opposition itself.
We need a refusal o f t h e fixed and permanent quality of the binary opposition, a genuine historicization and deconstruction of the terms of sexual difference. \Ye must become more self-conscious about distinguishing between our analytic \,ocabular) and the material we want to analyze. \Ye must find ivays (howeveiimperfect) to continually subject our categories to criticism, our analyses to self-criticism. If we employ Jacques Ileri-ida's definition of deconstruction, this (Spring 1985) :and "LL'omen and hIoralit\ ," a special issue of Soclcii K~srarch, Sticti~r.\, 50 (Autumn 11183). Ily comments on the tencienc~ of historians to cite Gilligan come from reading unpublished nlanl~scripts and grant propoqals, and it seems unfair to cite those here. I ha\e kept track of the reterences for over five )ears, anci they are man\ and increasing. '"FPI~LII~I\~ .Sf~(di~~\, 6 (Spring 1980): 26-64, criticism means analyzing in context the way any binary opposition operates, reversing and displacing its hierarchical construction, rather than accepting it as real o r self-evident o r in the nature of things.:':' In a sense, of course, feminists have heen doing this for years. T h e history of feminist thought is a history of the refusal of the hierai-chical construction o f t h e relationship between male and female in its specific contexts and an attempt to reverse o r displace its operations. Feminist historians are now in a position to theorire their practice and to develop gender as a n analytic category. twentieth centui-y. It is absent from the major bodies of social theory articulated from the eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. '1'0 be sure, some of those theories huilt their logic on analogies to the opposition of male and female, others ack~lowledged a "woman question," still others addressed the formation of subjective sexual identity, but gender as a way of' talking ahout systems of social or sexual relations did not appear. This neglect may in part explain the difficulty that contemporary feminists have had incorporating the term gender into existing bodies of' theory and convincing adherents of' one o r another theoretical school that gender belongs in their vocabulary. T h e term gender is part of the attempt by contemporarv feminists to stake claim to a certain definitional ground, to insist on the inadequacy of existing bodies of theory for explaining persistent inequalities between women and men. It seem5 to rrle significant that the use of the word gender has emerged at a moment of great epistemological turmoil that takes the form, in some cases, of a shift from scientific to literary paradigms among social scientists (from an emphasis on cause to one on meaning, blurring genres of inquiry, in anthropologist Clifford Geertz's phrase),:'% and, in other cases, the form of debates about theory between those who assert the transparency of' facts and those who insist that all reality is construed or constructed, betwreen those who defend and those who question the idea that "man" is the rational master of his own destiny. In the space opened 1 1t his debate and on the side of'the critique of science developed b!-the humanities, and of' empiricism and humanism by post-structuralists, feminists have not only hegun to find a theoretical voice of their otvn but have found scholarly and political allies as well. It is within this space that we must articulate gender as an analytic category. What should be done b!. historians ivho, after all, have seen their discipline disrrlissed by some recent theorists as a relic of' hurnanist thought? I d o not think 1i.e should quit the archives o r abandori the study of'the past, hut we d o have to change some of'the ways we have gone about ivorking, some of the questions we I < l3\ "elrcon\truction." I mean to e\oke Derrida'\ cliscusuion, \\.hicti, tliough it surel) ciici not inlent the proceti~~re it descril~es, tlas the virtue of theonzing it so that it can constitute a useful of anal!\i\ nietlioti. '' (; littorel (; vc, rtz, "hlurrecl Genre\." .~III<~IIC(III S(Iio/iir, 49 [Octuber 1980): 165-79, ha\,e asked. We need to scrutinize our methods of anal! sis, clarify our operative assun~ptions, and explain how we think change occurs. Instead of a search for single origins, we have to conceive of processes so interconnected that they cannot be disentangled. Of' course, we identify problems to study, and these constitute beginnings or points of' entry into conlplex processes. But it is the processes we must continually keep in mind. We must ask more often how things happened in order to find out u.hy they happened; in anthropologist Slichelle Kosaldo's formulation, we must pursue not uni\,ersal, general ca~~sality hut meaningful explanation: "It now appears to me that woman's place in human social life is not in an!-direct sense a product of' the things she does, but of the meaning her activities acquire through concrete social interaction.":'To pursue rneaning, we need to deal with the individual sut>ject as well as social organiration and to articulate the nature of their interrelationships, for both are crucial to understanding how gender works, how change occurs. Finally, we need to replace the notion that social power is unified, coherent, and centralized rvith something like Foucault's concept of power as dispersed constellations of unequal relationships, discursively constituted in social "fields of force.":"; \\'ithill these processes and structures, there is room fi)r a concept of human agency as the attempt (at least partially rational) to construct a n identity, a life, a set of relationstlips, a society with certain limits and with language-conceptual language that at once sets houndaries and contains the possibility for negation, resistance, reinterpretation, the play of metaphoric invention and imagination. 51y definition of gender has two parts and sel-era1 subsets. 'l'hey are interrelated hut must be analytically distinct. I'he core of the definition rests on an integral connection between two propositions: gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived diff'erences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power. Changes in the organization of social relationships always correspond to changes in representations of power, but the direction of change is not necessarily one wa!. . As a constitutive element of social relationships based on percei\,ed differences between the sexes, gender involves four interrelated elements: first, culturally available symbols that evoke multiple (and often contradictory) 1-epresentations-Eve and Slary as symbols of woman, for example, in the \Vestern Christian tradition-but also, myths of light and dark, purification and pollution, innocence and corruption. For historians, the interesting questions are, ~\.hich symbolic representations are invoked, how, and in !\.hat contexts? Second, normative concepts that set forth interpretations o f t h e meanings of the syrnhols, that attempt to limit and contain their metaphoric possibilities. These concepts are expressed in religious, educational, scientific, legal, and political doctrines and typically take the torn1 of a fixed hinary opposition, categoricall!-and unequivocally asserting the ~tieaning of' male and female, masculine and feminine. In fact, these normative statements depend on (New York, 1$)80);Xlichel E'o~lcaulc, T h r ffccton of Si,~c~iilitr. I~ittocluc/~ori I-'oi~'er~k'rroir~lr(1,yr: Srlrcreci I,ztr,; ~r,; c,\ a1111 Otlca~ Il.rrt~tr,~,. 1972 -77 (Sew York, 1080 . the refusal or repl-ession of alternative possibilities, and, sometimes, overt contests about them take place (at what moments and under ~i h a t circu~nstances ought to be a concern of historians). T h e position that emerges as dominant, however, is stated as the only possible one. Subsequent history is written as if these normative positions were the product of social consensus rather than of conflict. An example of this kind of history is the treatment of the Yictorian ideology of donlesticity as if it were created ~i h o l e and only afterlvards reacted to instead of being the constant sut~ject of great differences of opinion. Another kind of example comes from contemporary fundamentalist religious groups that have forcibly linked their practice to a restoration of women's supposedly more authentic "traditional" role. ~i h e n , in fact, there is little historical precedent for the unquestioned performance of such a role. T h e point of new historical investigation is to disrupt the notion of fixity. to discover the nature of the debate o r repression that leads to the appearance of timeless permanence in binary gender representation. This kind of analysis must include a notion of politics as well as reference to social institutions and organizations-the third aspect of gender relationships.
Some scholars, notably anthropologists. have restricted the use of gender to the kinship system (focusing on household and family as the basis for social organization). \Ye need a broader view that includes not only kinship but also (especially for con~plex. modern societies) the labor market (a sex-segregated labor market is a part of the process of gender construction), education (all-male, single-sex, o r coeducational institutions are part of the same process), and the polity (universal male suffrage is part of the process of gender construction). It nlakes little sense to force these institutions back to functional utility in the kinship system, o r to argue that contemporary relationships betrieen men and lionlen are artifacts of older kinship systems based on the exchange of w o~n e n .~; Gender is constructed through kinship, but not exclusively; it is constructed as well in the economy and the polity, which, in our society at least, now operate largely independently of kinship.
T h e fourth aspect of gender is sub-jective identity. I agree with anthropologist Gayle Rubin's for~nulation that psychoanalysis offers a n important theory about the reproduction of gender. a description of the "transformation of the biological sexuality of individuals as they are enculturated.":'8 But the universal claim of psychoanalysis gives me pause. Even though Lacanian theory rnay be helpf~il fur thinking about the construction of gendered identity, historians need to work in a more historical liay. If gender identity is based only and universally o n fear of castration. the point of historical inquiry is denied. hloreover. real men and wornen d o not alliays o r literally fulfill the terms of their society's prescriptions o r of our analytic categories. Historians need instead to examine the ways in which gendered identities are substantively constructed and relate their findings to a range of activities, social organi~ations, and historically specific cultural representations. I ' h e best efforts in this area so far have been, not surprisingly, biographies: Biddy T h e first part of my definition of gender consists, then, of all four of these elements, and no one ofthern operates without the others. Yet they d o not operate simultaneously, ~i i t h one simply reflecting the others. A -\question for historical research is. in fact, Iihat the relationships among the h u r aspects are. T h e sketch I have offered of the process of constructing gender relationships could be used to discuss class, race, ethnicity, or, for that matter, any social process. hIy point Tvas to clarify and specify how one needs to think about the effect of gender in social and institutional relationships, because this thinking is often not done precisely o r systematically. T h e theorizing of gender. ho~iever. is developed in nly second proposition: gender is a primary Liay of signifying relationships of po\l.er. It might be better to say, gender is a primary field ~i i t h i n ~i h i c h or by means of r$.hich polier is al-ticulatetl. C;erltle~. is not the only field. but it seems to have been a persistent and recurrent Iiay of enabling the signification of' polier in the West, in Judeo-C:hristian as lie11 as Islamic traditions. As such, this part of the definition might seern to belong in the nonnative section of the argument, yet it does not. for coricepts of polier, though they may build on gender, are not always literally about gender itself. French sociologist Pierre Bow-dieu has written about holi the "tli-vision d u morlde." based on references t o "biological differences and notably those that refer to the division of the labor of procreation and reproduction," operates as "the best-fountled of collective illusions." E:stablished as an ot~~jective set of references. concepts of gender structure perception and the concrete and symbolic organization of all social life." T o the extent that these references establish distributions of polier (differential control over or access to material and syrnbolic resources). gender becomes inlplicated in the conception and construction of polver itself. 'I'he French anthropologist hlaurice Ciodelier has put it this Iiay: "It is not sexuality lvhich haunts society, but society ~i h i c h haunts the body's sexuality. Sex-related differences b e t~i e e n bodies are continually sunlmoned as testimony to social relations and phenomena that have nothing to d o lcith sexuality. S o t only as testirnony to, l )~i t also testirnony hr-in other ~i o r d s , as l e g i t i n~a t i o n . "~~ 3'1 Biddy llartin, "Felllinism. <:rititi\m and Foucault." .Vrzi ( (; rr~rln~r Cr~trrjrrr, 27 (Fall 19x2 T h e legitimizing function of gender works in many ways. Bourdieu, for example. showed how, in certain cultures, agricultural exploitation was organized according to concepts of time and season that rested on specific definitions of the opposition between masculine and feminine. Gayatri Spivak has done a pointed analysis of the uses of gender in certain texts of British and American women Natalie Davis has shown how concepts of masculine and feminine related to understandings and criticisms of the rules of social order in early modern France.44 Historian Caroline Bynum has thrown new light on nledieval spirituality through her attention to the relationships between concepts of masculine and feminine and religious behavior. Her work gives us important insight into the ways in which these concepts informed the politics of monastic institutions as well as of individual be1ieve1-S.~%A historians have opened a new territory by reading social implications from literal depictions of women and These interpretations are based on the idea that conceptual languages employ differentiation to establish meaning and that sexual difference is a primary way of signifying differentiation.47 Gender, then, provides a liay to decode meaning and to understand the complex connections among various forms of hunlan interaction. Fl'hen historians look for the ways in which the concept of gender legitimizes and constructs social relationships, they develop insigh; into the reciprocal nature of gender and society and into the particular and contextually specific ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics.
POLITIC:^ IS ONL.Y ONE OF THE AKEAS IN WHICH GENDEK can be used for historical analysis. I have chosen the folloriing examples relating to politics and power in their most traditionally construed sense. that is, as they pertain to government and the nation-state, for two reasons. First, the territory is virtually uncharted. since gender has been seen as antithetical to the real business of politics. Second, political history-still the dominant mode of historical inquiry-has been the stronghold of resistance to the inclusion of material or even questions about women and gender.
Gender has been employed literally or analogically in political theory to justify or criticize the reign of monarchs and to express the relationship between ruler and ruled. One might have expected that the debates of contemporaries over the ( I~r r i I ; ) . n~~r~ Calif., 15)75), 124-51. that implemented this view redefined the limits of the marital relationship. Similarly, in o u r oIvn time, conservative political ideologues would like to pass a series of larvs about the organization and behavior of the family that rvould alter current practices. 'I he connection bet~veen authoritarian regimes and the control of rvomen has been noted but not thoroughly studied. Ll'hetlier at a crucial rnornent for Jacobin hegernony in the French Revolution, at the point of Stalin's bid for controlling authorit!., the irnplernentation of Nazi polic!. in German!., o r the triumph in Iran of'the Ayatollah Khonieni, emergent rulers have legitimized dornination, strength, central authorit!., and ruling poiver as masculine (enemies, outsiders, subversives, ~veakness as feminine) and rrlade that code literal in laivs (forbidding ~vonien's political participation, outla~ving abortion, prohibiting \\age-earning by mothers, imposing female dress codes) that put \vonlen in their place.g" These actions and their timing make little sense in themselves; in most instances, the state had nothing immediate o r material to gain from the control of Ivonien. T h e actions can only be made sense of as part of' an analysis of the construction arid consolidation of poTver. An assertion of control or strength Tvas given forni as a policy about ~v o~n e n .
I11 these examples, sexual difference Tvas conceived in ternis of' the dornination o r control of Ivonien. 'rhese examples provide sonie insight into the kinds of'power relationships being constructed in niodern history, but this particular type of relationship is not a universal political theme. I11 different rvays, for example, the deniocratic regimes of the t~ventieth century have also constructed their political ideologies rvith gendei-ed concepts and translated them into policy; the ~velfai-e state, for example, demonstrated its protective paternalisrri i r i la~vs directed at Ivornen and cllildren.i:3 Historically, some socialist and anarchist movements have refused metaphors of' tloniination entirely, iniaginativel!. presenting their critiques of' particular reginles o r social organizations in ternis of'trar~sformatior~s of' gender identities. Utopian socialists in France antl England in the 1830s a~~d 1840s conceived their dreams for a harmonious future in terms of'the cornplernentary natures of individuals as exemplified in the union of' Inan and rvornan, "the social individual .'''.& European anarchists Ivere long knorvn not 0111). for refusing the conventions of' bourgeois marriage but also for their visions of a rvol-ltl in rvhicli sexual difference did not imply hierarch!.. These exarriples are of explicit connections betiveen gender and power, but they are only a part o f my defiriition of gender as a pri~nary Tva!. of signif!.ing " 0 1 1 the FI-enc 11 Ke\olutiot~. st.e L)arlt.ne <;av L.cv\. I1a1-rict .Applewhite, a r~d l l a r v l o h n s o n . cds.. Il'onrcj~irri Kc~olirtrii~iiirr Pn~r\.1789 -179i (LTr-[)and. Ill.. 1979 (~ 1'377) : J a n e Jcnson. "Ger~tler a n d Kt.prod~lction": Jane Le\\i,. Tlrr I'olltrr\ of .\lotl!rrhood: Chrld nrid'.\lntr1-71nI Il.~,lfar~, tn En,~Ictnd 1900 -1939 (hlontrcal. 1980 : hlarv L.vnn hlcDo~~gall. relatiorlships of poiver. Xttentior~ to gender is often not explicit. but it is nonetheless a crucial part of'the organi~ation of equality or inequality. Hiera]-chical structures rely on generalized understandings of the so-called natural relationship betiveen niale and female. 'I'he concept of' class in the nineteenth ceritury relied on gender for its ai-ticulation. \17hen middle-class refi~rmers in France, for example, depicted tvorkers in terms coded as feminine (subordinated, tveak, sexually exploited like prostitutes), labor and socialist leaders replied by insisting on the masculine position of' the working class (producers, strong, protectors of' their tvornen and children). 'rhe terms of'this discourse tvere not explicitly about gender, but they relied on references to it, the gendered "coding" of certain terms, to establihh their meanings. In the process, historically specific, normative definitions of gender (tvhich ivere taken as givens) tvrre reproduced and enlbedded in the culture of the French t\.orking class."
T h e subject of' \Val-, diplomacy, and high politics frequentl!. conies u p tvhen traditional political historians question the utility of' gender in their tvork. But here, too, tve need to look beyond the actors and the literal import of their n.ords. Potver relations among nations and the statL1.s of colonial sul~jects have been niade comprehensible (and thus legitimate) in terrns of' relations bet~veen rnale and fernale. 'I'he legitimizing of'it.ar--of expending young lives to protect the state--has variously taken the f o r~n s of'explicit appeals to manhood (to the need to defend otherwise vulnerable women and children), of irnplicit reliance on belief in the duty of sons to serve their leaders or their (father the) king, and of associations between rnasculi~lity and national strength."; High politics itself is a gendered concept. for it establishes its crucial importance and public pott.er, the reasons filr and the fact of its highest authority, precisel!. in it5 exclusion of tvornerl f'rorn its tvork. Gender is one of the recurrent references by which political potver has been conceived, legitimated, and criticized. It refers to but also establishes the ~neaning of the rnalelfemale opposition. To \ indic'rte political poi\ er, the I e f e r e n~e must seem sure and fixed, outside human consti-uction, part of' the natural or divine order. In that way, the binary opposition and the social process of gender relationships both become part of the meaning of potver itself'; to question or alter any aspect threatens the entire system.
If significations of gender and po\ver construct one another, hotv d o things change? T h e answer in a general sense is that change rriay be initiated in many places. Massive political upheavals that throrv old orders into chaos and bring new ones into being ma!. revise the terrrls (and so the ol-ganization) of gender in the search for new foi-lrls of legitimation. But the!. niay not; old notio~ls of' gender have r , i~,~t r i " 'Draupadi' IIV XIal~ns\c~a Iriqitrr?, 8 ([t'intel-1981) : C:hakra\or~\ S p i~a k . I)c\i." (.~rt~cctl 3 8 1 4 0 2 : Horrri Bhat)lr,i, "Of XIimicr-) c~ticl Xlan: T h e .\l~ll)i\;ller~ce 0 ( / 0 1 ) 0 7 . 28 of (;oIo~lial I ) i s~o~i~-\ e . " (Spr-ir~g 1!)84): 1?5-33: N,~tiorl's Obligat~or~s Karin I l a u \ e r~. "l'tlr to the Hct-ocs' \Viclo\\\ of \Vor-Id \\'ax-I." in hIar-gal-et K. Higonnct. rjt (11.. cd\., I l ' o r~c~, ~~. (New l l a \ e r~. C:onn.. ICIXti). See It~nrcirid I!r\toi-i also Ken Inglis. "The Keprcscntation of (;cndcr Slcrno~-~,rl\." o n .\~lstl-'ilian\V:IIunp~it)li\hcd papelprcser~ted at the Ucllagio (:ontcr-cnce o n (;er~der. Tectlnolog\ and Ed~ic;~tiorl. 0c-1ol)cr-1085.
